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Insurer's Duty to Defend
FRANK REVERE*
ARTHUR J. CHAPMAN**
The duty to defend the insured in litigation is a fundamental provi-
sion of insurance contracts covering claims by third parties. As in other
jurisdictions, this duty is a frequent source of litigation in California1
or at the very least presents daily problems of interpretation to both
plaintiff and defense lawyers and insurance industry personnel; all this,
despite the California Supreme Court's definitive treatment of the sub-
ject in Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co.2
This article will trace the development of the substantive law both
before and after the Gray decision and will identify some of the
problems and risks faced daily by insurance industry personnel and
will make some recommendations for handling the duty to defend
problem.
SUBSTANTIVE LAW BEFORE G/ Y
The initial California case dealing with the duty to defend is Greer-
Robbins Co. v. Pacjfc Surey Co.3 decided in 1918 by the Second Dis-
J.D., 1961, Loyola University, Los Angels. Member State Bar of California; Association
of Southern California Defense Counsel. The author is the principal of the firm of Revere &
Wallace, Los Angeles, California.
** A.B., 1973, Political Science, U.C.L.A.; J.D., 1977, Loyola University, Los Angeles.
Member State Bar of California; Associate in the firm of Revere & Wallace, Los Angeles,
California.
1. This article will discuss the duty to defend as applicable in California. For a survey of
the law of other jurisdictions see generally Kircher & Quinn, Insurer's Duty to Defend-an Over-
view, in DEFENSE RESEARCH INsTrTUTE, No. 3 (1978).
2. 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
3. 37 Cal. App. 540, 174 P. 110 (1918).
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trict Court of Appeal. Here, the insured, Greer-Robbins Company
brought an action against its insurer for the recovery of the cost and
expense incurred by the insured in defending the claims of one Hill. Of
note is the fact that both the insured and insurer agreed that the insured
was not entitled to indemnification for the subject claim. Hence, the
case was decided purely on the question of whether or not the insured
was entitled to recover the cost and expense which it had incurred in
defending the Hill action upon the refusal of the insurer to do so.
4
On appeal, the insurer contended that whether or not it owed a de-
fense to its insured depended upon the outcome of the third party liti-
gation or, simply stated, whether it had a duty to defend could only be
determined after the time for the performance of the obligation had
entirely elapsed rather than before it had commenced to run. This
logic was unpersuasive to the Court of Appeal, which, among other
things, noted that were this position to be adopted in all cases, it would
work an alteration of the very language of the policy, making the words
"will defend" meaningless, and likewise the duty to defend meaning-
less. It was clear to the court that upon an independent investigation,
or even in the absence thereof, an insurer could decline to defend thus
imposing upon the insured a duty to defend in every case. Accord-
ingly, the Court of Appeal stated:
There is a more certain basis for a determination of the liability of
the appellant (insurer) to defend, and that basis is to be found in the
allegations of the complaint in each action for damages against the
respondent (insured). We construe the policy to mean that it is a
duty of the appellant (insurer), under its terms, to defend every ac-
tion in which the complaint shows 'a claim for damages covered by
this policy.'5
The rule adopted by the Court of Appeal in the Greer-Robbins opinion
is the majority rule in the United States and is sometimes referred to as
the "traditional rule."
'6
4. The exact language of the Pacific Surety Company policy as pertains to its duty to defend
is as follows:
In addition to the limits hereinafter specified, if any suit is brought a~ainst the assured to
enforce a claim for damages coveredby this policy, the company will defend such suit,
whether groundless or not, in the name and on behalf of the assured. The expenses
incurred by the company in defending such suit, including costs, if any, taxed against the
assured, will be borne by the company, whether the judgment is for or against the as-
sured. If any suit, even if groundless, is brought against the assured to recover damages
on account of injuries or deaths covered by this policy, the assured shall immediately
forward to the company, or to the office of its nearest authorized general agent, every
summons or other process served, or copy thereof, thereupon the company will, at its
own cost and expense, defend such suit m the name and on behalf of the assured.
Id. at 543, 174 P. at I l1.
5. Id. at 544, 174 P. at I 11.
6. SeeAnnot., 50 A.L.R. 2d 458, 463-64 (1956); see also Maxon v. Security Ins. Co., 214
Cal. App. 2d 603, 29 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1963).
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Given the fact that Greer-Robbins stated the traditional rule, it is in-
teresting to note that appellate decisions in California with respect to
the duty to defend were totally absent until 1935. Some 17 years later,
the First Appellate District, Division One, of the Court of Appeal made
its decision in Lamb v. Belt Casualty Co.
7
The Lamb case arose as a dispute between two separate insurance
carriers. In particular, the case concerned whether the two carriers
owed a duty to defend and indemnify the owner of the insured prop-
erty. The Court of Appeal followed the general rule set forth in the
Greer-Robbins case by stating that "the language of its contract must
first be looked to, and next the allegations of the complaints in each
action for damages against the insured." 8
The Court of Appeal, after concluding that the refusal to defend the
suit was wrongful, concluded that:
the denial of liability on the part of the insuring company and its
refusal to defend the suits constituted such a breach of the contract
that the insured was released from his obligation to leave the man-
agement thereof to it, and was justified in proceeding to defend on
his own account. 9
The court pointed out that in the event the insurer refused to defend,
any judgment in the underlying action was conclusive evidence that the
insured was liable to the extent of the amount of the judgment."
When, however, there was no trial and no judgment, but there was a
settlement of the litigation, the question whether the liability of the in-
sured was one which the contract of insurance covered would remain
open, as would the question of liability and the extent thereof.1 The
court recognized that these questions could properly be determined in
an action by the insured to recover the amount paid in settlement of the
litigation. Under such circumstances the settlement becomes presump-
tive evidence only of the liability of the insured and the amount
thereof. 12
The issue of when the duty to defend arises was once again discussed
in depth in Maxon v. Security Insurance Company.13 After summariz-
ing the traditional rule that "the obligation to defend is measured by
comparing the terms of the insurance policy with the pleadings of the
claimants who sue the insured,"' 4 the court restated the critical rule
7. 3 Cal. App. 2d 624, 40 P.2d 311 (1935).





13. 214 Cal. App. 2d 603, 29 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1963).
14. Id. at 616, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
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that "the insurer's obligation to defend is one that must be determined
before the outcome of the action against the assured, not thereafter."'
5
Any contrary rule would have the effect of wiping out all together the
obligation to defend.
However, the court in the Maxon case again noted the limitation of
the duty by stating that "the insurer is not required to defend an action
against the insured when the complaint in that action shows on its face
that the injury complained of is not only not covered by, but is ex-
cluded from the policy."' 6 Thus, the court refused to make the duty
absolute and preserved the then existing exceptions.
THE GRAY CASE AND ITS PROGENIES
In the landmark case of Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. 17 the Califor-
nia Supreme Court re-examined the question of the duty to defend
and, in the course of this examination, rejected the majority rule which
required an insurer to defend any action against its insured in which
the complaint showed on its face that the alleged injuries are within the
terms of the policy coverage. In Gray, the California Supreme Court
chose to set forth a new and more expansive view of the duty to defend
holding that the "carrier must defend a suit which potentially seeks
damages within the coverage of the policy."1
18
The language of the Gray case implies that the factors to be consid-
ered with regard to the duty to defend should include facts which the
insurer learns from the insured as well as any facts ascertained from its
own independent investigation and sources.' 9 The insurer, upon learn-
ing of these facts, has a duty to defend its insured whenever it ascer-
tains facts which give rise to the potential of liability under the policy.20
The facts of the Gray case provide the background needed to more
fully understand the court's rationale and eventual holding. It was an
action by the insured against his insurer for failure to defend an action
brought against the insured which stemmed from a complaint alleging
that the insured had committed an assault. The underlying action
arose when a Mr. Jones filed a complaint alleging that Dr. Gray "will-
fully, maliciously, brutally and intentionally" assaulted him. Dr. Gray
then tendered the defense of the lawsuit to his insurer, Zurich Insur-
ance Company, and requested that Zurich defend the tort action. Per-
haps more importantly, Dr. Gray notified the company that he had
15. Id. at 617, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
16. Id.; see Rernmer v. Glen Falls Indem. Co., 140 Cal. App. 2d 84, 295 P.2d 19 (1956).
17. 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
18. Id. at 275, 419 P.2d at 176, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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acted in self-defense. Zurich Insurance Company refused to defend on
the ground that the alleged intentional tort fell outside the policy cover-
age. Dr. Gray was unsuccessful in his defense on the self-defense the-
ory and suffered a judgment of $6,000. He then brought an action
against Zurich for failure to defend."1 The insurance policy issued to
Dr. Gray by Zurich Insurance Company represented a comprehensive
personal liability policy, including two endorsements:
1. To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily
injury or property damage; and
2. . . . to defend any suit against the insured alleging such bodily
injury or property damaged in seeking damages which are paya-
ble under the terms of this endorsement, even if any of the alle-
gations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent...zz
The court's rationale in concluding that Zurich's refusal to defend
was a wrongful one was twofold. Initially, the Court determined that
any ambiguity in the insurance policy and any doubts as to its meaning
were to be resolved against the insurer and that this principle of inter-
pretation takes on new meaning with regard to the doctrine of adhesion
contracts.2 3 The court recognized that the contract was entered into
between two parties of unequal bargaining strength and that the con-
tract was offered to the weaker party on a "take it or leave it basis."
Under this set of circumstances it was determined that the duty to de-
fend, as set forth in the insurance policy, was a primary one and that
the policy failed to clearly and in unambiguous terms indicate that the
duty to defend would be subject to limitations based upon other exclu-
sions in the policy. In other words, the court determined that the Zu-
rich Insurance Policy, as written, did not in any way spell out that the
duty to defend had any limitations upon it at all. Rather, the court
found that it was a primary duty and was not co-extensive with its duty
to indemnify the insured.24 The court then concluded that the reason-
able expectation of a person reading such a policy would be to expect a
defense by the insurer in all personal injury actions against him.2 5 This
was because the relationship between the exclusionary clause with re-
spect to the refusal to indemnify for intentional acts and the basic
promise to defend was anything but clear.
The court's second stated rationale was that since modem procedural
rules focus on the facts of the case rather than the theory of recovery
21. Id. at 267, 419 P.2d at 170, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 269, 419 P.2d at 171, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
24. Id. at 273, 419 P.2d at 173-74, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 109-10.
25. Id.
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stated in the complaint, the duty to defend should be fixed by the facts
which the insurer learns from the complaint, the insured and other
sources.
26
Under the new rule set forth in the Gray case, the insurance carrier
must determine whether a potential of liability exists, and if so, a duty
to defend arises. The language of the Gray case implies that this infor-
mation may come from the insured, other sources, or the insurer's
independent investigation. 7 The test of "potential of liability" repre-
sented a radical departure from the traditional rule, but the court rea-
soned that the traditional rule that relied on pleadings was a dated
one.28 This is particularly true in light of modem pleading rules that
require notice pleading and provide for liberal rules of amendment.
The facts of the Gray case stand as an excellent example of how the
traditional rule with respect to the duty to defend based solely upon the
pleadings would lead one to an improper result. In that case the plead-
ings indicated an intentional act by Dr. Gray, however, by way of af-
firmative defense Dr. Gray had pleaded that he had acted in self
defense, thus negating the requirement of intent. Finally, although the
court recognized that it was setting forth an expansive rule with respect
to the duty to defend, it went to pains to indicate that the duty to de-
fend was not absolute. For instance, it was concluded that "the insured
would not expect a defense for an injury involving an automobile
under a general comprehensive policy which excluded automobile cov-
erage. We look to the nature and kind of risk covered by the policy as
a limitation upon the duty to defend. '2 9 This language negates claims
made by some in the insurance industry that the duty to defend was
made absolute by the Gray ruling.30 Instead, the rule is simply that the
carrier must defend a suit whichpotentially seeks damages within the
coverage of the policy, to the extent that the nature of the claim bears a
reasonable relationship to the occurrence covered.
Therefore, the conclusion is unmistakable that the duty to defend,
while not absolute, is broader than the duty to indemnify and in many
cases, the duty to defend will arise even though there is no duty to
indemnify.
In the years that followed the Gray decision, the appellate courts,
while adhering to the principle enunciated in Gray, reiterated that there
were in fact limitations upon the duty to defend. It was held, for exam-
26. Id. at 276, 419 P.2d at 176-77, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 113.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 275, 419 P.2d at 175, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 111.
30. See Note, 7he Insurance Du 0 to Defend MadeAbsolute: Gray v. Zurich, 14 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 1328 (1967).
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ple, by the Third District Court of Appeal in State Farm MutualAuto-
mobile Insurance Co. v. Fynt,31 that:
the 'groundless, false, or fraudulent' clause of an insurance contract
does not extend the obligation to defend without limits, but includes
only defenses to those actions of the nature and kind covered by the
policy, and the allegations of a complaint ified by a third party
against an insured are not determinative of the insurance company's
obligation to defend the suit.32
The court also recognized that an independent investigation by the car-
rier may lead it to the conclusion that potential liability does not exist
even though the pleadings would suggest that a duty to defend existed.
If this were true, the carrier might properly refuse to defend the suit.
33
If the carrier refuses to defend, however, it does so at its own risk, and
if it later develops that there is liability, or that potential liability ex-
isted under the policy, the company will be held accountable to its in-
sured, or to one who obtained judgment against the insured in the
action it refused to defend.34 In addition, the courts have recognized
that the obligation to defend a lawsuit comes to an end where the lia-
bility phase of a bifurcated trial resulted in liability imposed solely with
respect to matters not covered by a policy.
35
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In two very recent cases, Giddings v. Industrial Indemnity Co.36 and
Miller v. Elite Insurance CO. 3 1 the California courts re-examined the
obligation of an insurance carrier to defend and shed light on the na-
ture and extent of the duty to defend in the context of different factual
circumstances.
The Giddings case, decided by the Fourth District Court of Appeal,
arose as an action by the insureds against their insurers following a
refusal by the insurers to defend the lawsuit. The issue involved "prop-
erty damage" under liability insurance policies. The complaint filed
against the insured alleged strictly economic losses such as lost profits,
loss of good will, loss of anticipated benefit of a bargain, and loss of
investment. The insurers took the position that such losses did not con-
31. 17 Cal. App. 3d 538, 95 Cal. Rptr. 296 (1971).
32. Id. at 548, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 302.
33. Id. at 549, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 302.
34. 65 Cal. 2d at 279, 419 P.2d at 178,54 Cal. Rptr. at 104; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Flynt, 17 Cal. App. 3d 538, 95 Cal. Rptr. 296 (1971). For similar discussions regarding limitations
on the duty to defend, see Dillon v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 38 Cal. App. 3d 335, 113
Cal. Rptr. 396 (1974).
35. California Union Ins. Co. v. Club Aquarius, 113 Cal. App. 3d 243, 169 Cal. Rptr. 685
(1980).
36. 112 Cal. App. 3d 213, 169 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1980).
37. 100 Cal. App. 3d 739, 161 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1980).
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stitute "property damage" under the liability insurance policy issued to
the insured, and on this basis refused to defend the actions.
While the court in Giddings recognized that an insurer's duty to de-
fend litigation brought against its insured is broader than its duty to
indemnify and that the insurer must furnish a defense when it learns
facts creating a potential of liability under the policy, it noted that the
insured's obligation was not unlimited. It was held that the Giddings
case was readily distinguishable from Gray and many of the cases fol-
lowing it, which have broadly interpreted the insurer's duty to defend.
In the Gray case, the court noted that damage of the type covered by
the policy had undisputably occurred, and the insurer relied on an un-
clear exclusionary clause in asserting it was not obligated to defend its
insured.38 In the Giddings matter, on the other hand, the "question
concerns the scope of basic coverage itself."3 9 After determining that
strictly economic losses such as lost profits, loss of good will, loss of
anticipated benefit of a bargain, and loss of an investment, did not con-
stitute damage or injury to tangible property covered by a comprehen-
sive general liability policy, the court conluded that the Giddings were
entitled to a defense only if the third party's actions potentially sought
recovery for damage to, or accidental loss of, use of tangible property.40
The court held that "no recovery and no duty to defend existed if the
action potentially sought recovery only for damages to economic inter-
ests and property damage,"41 as such claims would constitute claims for
damages of such a nature not potentially within the scope of the insur-
ance coverage. While concluding that there was no duty to defend, the
court nonetheless based its decision on the holding of the Gray case.
The test remained that of the potential of liability under the policy.
In the case of Miller v. Elite Insurance Co. ,42 the First District Court
of Appeal held that the duty to defend had been violated where the
carrier's denial of coverage was based upon ambiguous exclusionary
language.43
In the Miller case, the insured brought suit against his motorcycle
liability insurer for breach of its obligation to defend, together with an
action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing, regarding a claim brought against the insured for damages result-
ing from a fire that the insured accidently caused while working on his
motorcycle in the garage of the home that he was renting. The motor-
38. 112 CaL App. 3d at 218, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 219, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 280.
41. Id.
42. 100 Cal. App. 3d 739, 161 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1980).
43. Id. at 752, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
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cycle liability insurance policy issued by Elite Insurance Company to
Miller contained an exclusionary clause for destruction of property
"rented to or in charge of the insured."'  The company took the posi-
tion that the lawsuit filed against Miller for destruction of property was
not one that "potentially seeks damages within the policy" by virture of
the exclusionary language, and thus no duty to defend arose.45
The court concluded that a duty to defend existed under the circum-
stances of the case. The court first determined that the exclusionary
clause that the company relied upon was not unambiguous. In the first
place, the facts suggested that someone other than the insured was rent-
ing the premises, therefore making that portion of the exclusion inap-
plicable. Additionally, it was determined that "in charge of the
insured" was ambiguous despite the fact that it virtually mirrored the
language of California Insurance Code Section 11580.1(c) and (c)(6).
4 6
The court noted that there was no indication whether any or all of the
"property" referred to in the policy was real or personal property. The
court concluded that no lay person could reasonably assume that the
"property rented to or in charge of insured, referred to real property
since it would seem applicable primarily to portable goods."' 47 For this
reason, the exclusionary language was held to be ambiguous. More-
over, as the policy was written, the exclusionary clause was not
presented in a conspicuous, clear and plain fashion so as to put the
insured on notice of the exceptions of coverage.
After concluding that coverage under the policy existed, the court
quite properly concluded that the company's refusal to defend was in
fact a wrongful one.48 The court's reasoning began with a recognition
that an insurer must defend a suit which potentially seeks damages
within the coverage of the policy. If there is a doubt as to whether the
insurer must defend, the doubt should be resolved in the insured's
favor.49 Finally, the court reasoned that the insured's reasonable ex-
pectation in the purchase of the policy in question was that the insurer
would cover damages caused by his motorcycle. The damage to the
property was within the nature and kind of risk which Miller would
have expected the policy to cover.
It is significant that the court noted that the insurance company had
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Policy exclusionary language refers to "property owned or transported by the insured, or
property rented to or in charge of the insured." CAL. INS. CODE §11580.1. The Insurance Code
permits, in pertinent part, exclusions for "liability for damage to property owned, rented to, trans-
ported by, or in charge of, an insured.' Id. §1 1580.1(c)(6).
47. 100 Cal. App. 3d at 757, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
48. Id. at 753, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
49. Id. at 756, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 331.
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established a "reserve' fund for the defense of the Miller claims. The
court found this to be an indication that the company perceived a pos-
sible duty to defend. Obviously, if the company believes that it has no
duty to defend, then it would not establish a "reserve." To do so will
undoubtedly prejudice its position in any subsequent litigation involv-
ing its duty to defend. The court also noted that the company had
taken another step that indicated it felt a possible duty to defend. In
the course of handling the claim the insurance company had presented
an offer of a compromised settlement. This was treated by the court as
evidence that Elite had indeed perceived a possible duty to defend. 0
The courts in both the Giddings and Miller cases have reasserted that
the insurer must defend a suit which potentially seeks damages within
the coverage of the policy. However, both cases illustrate, and particu-
larly the Miller case illustrates, that the test to be applied by a carrier
with regard to the duty to defend must be viewed with an eye towards
protecting the reasonable expectation of the insured.
The Miller case is also noteworthy in illustrating that a violation of
the duty to defend will often give rise to a claim that the insurance
company violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied
by law in all insurance contracts, thus exposing the insurer to punitive
damages.51 The courts have imposed upon insurance companies an
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in the negotiation and set-
tlement phases of insurance cases. 2 Good faith and fair dealing means
that each party is prevented from interfering with the other's right to
benefit from the contract. 3 Therefore, an insurance company that
wrongfully refuses to defend its insured must recognize that in wrong-
fully refusing to defend the company may violate its obligation of pro-
tecting the interests of the insured equally with its own, thus giving rise
to a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Such a claim may well expose an insurance company to a punitive
damage award, or require the payment of a verdict in excess of the
policy limits. 54
CONSEQUENCES OF WRONGFUL REFUSAL TO DEFEND
The insurer has no liability when it has made a proper refusal to
defend its insured. However, when the refusal to defend is determined
to be a "wrongful" refusal, the insurance carrier is liable for all dam-
50. Id. at 754, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
51. Id. at 766, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 331; Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 110 Cal.
Rptr. 511 (1973).
52. Greenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Ca. Rptr. 480 (1973).
53. 100 Cal. App. 3d at 756, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 332.
54. Id.
1982 / Duty to Defend
ages proximately caused by the insurer's wrongful act. 5 It was deter-
mined in Arenson v. National Automobile and Casualty Insurance Co.56
that an insurer's unwarranted refusal to defend a suit against the in-
sured relieves the insured from his contractual obligation to surrender
control of such lawsuit to the insurer, and therefore allows him to de-
fend the suit as he sees fit including choosing his own counsel.57
"Where the insured is thus compelled to conduct his own defense, he
may recover the expenses of litigation including costs and attorney's
fees from the insurer."5" This is so even though the insured's defense is
unsuccessful. Furthermore, the insured can recover the expenses of an
appeal in the event the grounds for appeal are reasonable, even if the
appeal is unsuccessful.59 In addition to the above costs and expenses, it
was held in the Gray case that the insurer who wrongfully refused to
defend is generally liable on the judgment against the insured even
when that judgment exceeds the policy limits.
60
In holding that the insurer who wrongfully refuses to defend is gen-
erally liable on the judgment against the insured, the Gray court ap-
plied the contract theory of recovery that had previously been upheld
in Tomerlin v. Canadian Indemnity Co.61 The Tomerlin case held that
the wrongful refusal to defend an action on the part of the insurance
company constituted a breach of the insurance contract. The court in
Tomerlin specifically rejected a theory presented to it that the breach of
the duty to defend sounded in tort rather than contract. In reaching its
conclusion the court reasoned that the tort theory would "inequitably
frustrate plaintiff's recovery" and that it would impose upon him the
burden of providing the precise extent of the loss caused by the with-
drawal of the insurer's attorney from a suit against the insured.62 The
court held, therefore, that the wrongful failure to defend opens the in-
surance carrier to liability for the whole amount of the judgment in-
cluding any amount in excess of the policy limits.
63
In addition, by refusing to defend an action, the insurer should rec-
ognize that by its actions it loses control of the defense of the litigation.
Once the insurer refuses to defend the suit, the insured is no longer
obligated under the contract to leave the management of the lawsuit to
the insurer. This, in turn, takes from the insurer the opportunity to
55. Arenson v. National Auto. & Cas. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 528, 310 P.2d 961 (1957).
56. Id. at 537, 310 P.2d at 967.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 539, 310 P.2d at 968.
59. Id. at 536, 310 P.2d at 967.
60. Arenson v. National Auto. & Cas. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 81, 84, 286 P.2d 816 (1955) (earlier
appeal of case cited at note 55 supra).
61. 61 Cal. 2d 638, 394 P.26 571, 39 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1964).
62. Id. at 649-50, 394 P.2d at 571, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
63. 45 Cal. 2d at 84, 286 P.2d at 816.
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control the course of the action, and, quite likely, takes away the oppor-
tunity to settle the case at a greatly reduced amount, thereby avoiding
the significant damages imposed on the insurance carrier for a wrong-
ful refusal to defend.
As a further, and perhaps more significant, item of damage imposed
for the wrongful refusal to defend, the courts have held that under the
appropriate factual circumstances an insurer who breaches the duty to
defend may be held liable for damages for pain and emotional distress
caused to its insured.64 The courts have recognized the "damages for
breach of the duty to defend are not inexorably imprisoned within the
policy limits, but are measured by the consequences proximately
caused by the breach. 65 While recognizing the traditional rule that the
insurer's liability is generally limited to the amount of the judgment,
the courts have held that where the damages proximately resulted from
the breach can be shown to include damages to the insured's comfort,
happiness, health and welfare, recovery will be permitted for the physi-
cal suffering caused by the breach.66 Therefore, in addition to exposing
the insurance company to liability for the whole amount of the judg-
ment, its actions may very well expose it to liability for damages for
pain and emotional distress caused to its insured.
PROPER APPROACH FOR INSURANCE COMPANIES, THEIR PERSONNEL
AND ATTORNEYS
By stating that the duty to defend arises at the pre-litigation stage of
a claim, the courts have served notice to the insurance industry that the
question of the duty to defend must be addressed immediately upon
receipt of notice of the claim. Therefore, as soon as the insurance car-
rier (hereinafter referred to as "Company") receives notice that a claim
is being presented against its insured that "potentially" seeks damages
within coverage of the policy, the Company must undertake to defend
that claim including an investigation and evaluation.67 The Company
is not justified in waiting until a lawsuit has been filed before undertak-
ing its duty to defend as such action would be contrary to the holding
that the duty to defend applies equally to the pre-litigation and litiga-
tion stages of a claim.68
Therefore, upon receiving notice of a claim the Company should im-
mediately undertake to determine whether or not the claim seeks dam-
64. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co v. Allstate Ins. Co., 9 Cal. App. 3d 508, 528, 88 Cal. Rptr.
246, 258 (1970).
65. Id. at 530, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
66. Id. at 528, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
67. See CAL. INS. CODE §790.03(h)(l)-(59) (Unfair Claims Practice Act).
68. Miller v. Elite Ins. Co., 100 Cal. App. 3d 739, 755, 161 Cal. Rptr. 322, 330 (1980).
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ages that "potentially" fall within the insurance coverage offered to its
insured. From the earlier discussion, it is apparent that such determin-
tion cannot be made from the complaint alone.69
In short, it is encumbent upon the Company's personnel to make a
benefits v. risks determination as to how to proceed. The "benefits"
referred to are the savings in legal and other loss expenses. The "risks"
referred to are: (1) loss of control of the defense of the action; (2) liabil-
ity for the expenses incurred by the insured in defending the litigation;
(3) liability on the judgment eventually obtained regardless of the
amount of the policy limits; and (4) possible liability to the insured for
damages on account of emotional distress. These substantial risks and
unfortunate consequences, as discussed earlier, may well dictate that
the risks be found to outweigh the benefits. Of course, if benefits and
risks are weighed at the pre-litigation stage, in keeping with the dictates
of the Miller decision, then the Company may avail itself of a declara-
tory relief action with every opportunity to have its obligations, if any,
adjudicated long before the potential underlying action is tried.70
Under these circumstances, many of the consequences of a bad faith
refusal can be avoided in the event that the court enters a declaratory
order adverse to the Company. In particular, the Company will avoid
liability in excess of policy limits. Furthermore, by seeking declaratory
relief at the pre-litigation stage, the Company can avoid the large ex-
penditures of providing a defense pursuant to a reservation of rights.
Obviously, if the declaratory relief action proceeds soon after the first
notice of the claim but before commencement of litigation by the plain-
tiff, defense costs would be kept at a minimum since the plaintiff's ac-
tion should not have proceeded beyond the preliminary stages. Hence,
the Company is able to minimize its risks and defense costs when it acts
promptly to ascertain its obligation to defend the insured. This is true
even if the Company loses the declaratory relief action. The Company
will be able to step in and defend the action and will, therefore, be able
to control its course. The maximum exposure the Company thereafter
faces when following an approach of this sort will be the policy limits
and, clearly, it has the opportunity to settle the action within the policy
limits when possible. Moreover, by seeking declaratory relief early in
the claim, the Company avoids the spectre of a subsequent action by
the insured alleging bad faith on the part of the insurer. In the long
run, therefore, the Company will experience substantial monetary
savings.
69. Id.
70. Declaratory relief actions are entitled to a trial setting preference in California. CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §1062(a).
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Clearly, in fact, there may be doubtful situations where the benefts v.
risks determination might be difficult. Of course, the determination of
benefits and risks must be made in keeping with the duties placed upon
the Company by virtue of Insurance Code Section 790.03(h)(l)-(15),
more commonly known as the Unfair Claims Practice Act.7' While it
must recognize its duties in this regard, the Company should not adopt
a policy of providing a defense whenever called upon. It is suggested
that the company adopt a specific procedure, such as the following, so
as to lead to the avoidance of unnecessary risks which are the obvious
consequence of an improper refusal to defend.
DOES THE COMPANY HAVE THE DUTY TO DEFEND?
A. With Notice of Claim before Litigation
When the Company receives notice of the claim prior to the filing of
an action by the injured party, it should undertake the following
procedures.
First, the Company should obtain basic information with regard to
the nature of the subject claim and the damages allegedly suffered.
This information should come from the insured, the injured party, the
Company's own sources and the Company's investigation of the claim.
Second, it should review the coverage provisions of the subject policy
to determine whether or not the subject claim is either "not covered" or
"excluded" by a specific provision in that policy.
If the claim is "not covered" by the policy, then it is up to the Com-
pany to notify its insured and the claimant or, claimant's counsel, in
writing within a reasonable time to the effect that the Company will not
defend if suit is filed nor will it indemnify the insured if a judgment is
rendered; the notice should state the reason for the refusal.
If, upon receipt of the notice, the insured fails to agree or questions
this determination in any way, the Company should obtain counsel for
the filing of a declaratory relief action to determine its obligations
under the policy. Counsel should be requested to proceed to trial as
quickly as possible.
If on the other hand the subject claim is "excluded" under the policy,
the following steps should be taken.
Initially, the Company should seek the written opinion of counsel
with respect to whether or not the subject exclusion is sufficiently un-
ambiguous so as to permit a refusal to defend despite the various tests
71. The Unfair Claims Practices Act is beyond the scope of this article. See Royal Globe Ins.
Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979).
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as set forth in Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co.7 2
Next, advise the insured in writing that such opinion has been sought
and advise the insured as to the opinion given.
If an opinion favorable to the insurer is given, the Company should
file a declaratory relief action to establish that the Company has no
duty to defend if any objection on the part of the insured is received. If
counsel's opinion is favorable to the insured, the Company must pre-
pare to defend and indemnify.
B. With Complaint Filed Prior to Notice
When a Complaint has been filed before a determination has been
made with regard to the duty to defend, then the following steps should
be taken.
First, the Company needs to obtain basic information with regard to
the nature of the subject claim and the damages allegedly suffered. It
should review the allegations of the Complaint and make an independ-
ent investigation of the facts. If any theory or cause of action is covered
by the subject policy, then a defense is owed to the insured. Second,
the Company should proceed as outlined above to analyze the policy
exclusions and areas of noncoverage recognizing that the Company
should defend under a reservation of rights where it is relying on an
exclusion.
While construing the insurance contract so as to protect the insured's
reasonable expectation, the carrier should recognize that if there is a
real doubt as to whether the Company must defend, the doubt should
be resolved in the insured's favor."3
Once it is determined that the claim does seek damages which poten-
tially fall within the insurance coverage, the Company should immedi-
ately tender to the insured a complete defense. Once the Company has
tendered a defense, it must act in utmost good faith to protect the inter-
ests of its insured equally with its own.74
Unfortunately, the courts have not offered clear standards which
may be used in determining whether the duty to defend is present so as
to provide a simple answer to each and every factual situation. Thus,
there are situations in which the Company may choose to defend the
insured even though coverage has not been determined. The Company
should, in such a situation, proceed under a reservation of rights. In
72. See 100 Cal. App. 3d at 753, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 330. See text accompanying notes 23-30
supra.
73. 100 Cal. App. 3d at 757, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 331.
74. Id.
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any instance where the Company reserves its fights it should do so by a
letter to the insured which meets the following standards.
The reservation of fights letter, in order to be effective, must be spe-
cific and clear enough to give the insured notice of the potential cover-
age problems. It must be sent as soon as reasonably possible in order to
avoid a waiver and estoppel situation. If the reservation of fights letter
is sent in a timely manner, the Company may undertake the defense of
the action and the insured may not successfully raise the claim that the
insurer has waived its fight to assert a defense that the claim is not
covered or excluded.75
Attention to the suggested approach should in fact amount to sub-
stantial savings to the Company. It is submitted that the costs of mak-
ing the "benefits versus risks" determination suggested in the approach,
including the expenses incurred with counsel for opinions and for the
prosecution of declaratory relief actions, are substantially smaller than
the costs which would be incurred were the Company to simply adopt a
policy of defending the insured in almost any situation. As mentioned
earlier, particular benefits may well flow to the Company in those cases
where it has notice of the claim prior to the institution of litigation.
However, even in those instances where litigation has been instituted
before the Company receives first notice of the claim, it nevertheless
stands to minimize its loss expense and indemnity expense if it acts
promptly by defending under a reservation of fights or by pursuing a
declaratory relief action. While great care must be taken in analyzing
the benefits and the risks involved, the savings in doing so properly will
well reward the effort.
CONCLUSION
The courts have made both the obligations and risks with regard to
the duty to defend clear and concise. Therefore, the Company should
recognize its obligations to make a determination as to both coverage
and defense and should do so promptly, thoroughly and in utmost good
faith. The Company must be aware of the consequences of its wrong-
ful refusal to perform its duty to defend. Hopefully the discussion in
the earlier portion of this article sheds light on the risks involved when
the carrier wrongfully refuses to defend an action. While the duty to
defend will most likely remain a frequent source of litigation in Cali-
fornia, it is the hope of these writers that the approach presented in this
article shall be of help to the insurance industry in resolving the day to
day problems which arise in conjunction with this duty. Careful analy-
sis under this approach should eliminate a wrongful refusal problem
and the subsequent financial loss.
75. Id. at 755, 161 Cal. Rptr.'at 330. For a discussion of reservation of rights letters see
Comment, Reservation of Rghts Notices and Nonwaiver Agreements, 12 PAC. L.J. 763-86 (1981).
